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Large accounting firms invest considerable resources into employee talent, yet we 
know little about whether, and when, such efforts are effective. I investigate whether one 
specific initiative intended to promote a supportive culture, equalized parental leave, results 
in higher audit quality at three audit firms. I find that audit quality improves following the 
adoption of equalized parental leave. I also use a novel dataset of audit employee 
characteristics to examine how office-level demographics directly impact audit quality and 
moderate the effectiveness of equalized leave. I provide evidence that staff auditor 
qualification is positively associated with audit quality, and show that the parental leave 
policy effect is moderated by employee demographics that reflect labor economics and 
work-life conflict. My study informs academic literature and practitioners on the 
importance of managing audit firm culture, builds on the broader literature of economic 
impacts of paid family leave, and highlights one effective talent management strategy. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
“Our people are critical to our ability to deliver high-quality audits. That’s why 
attracting, inspiring, retaining and developing great people and promoting a culture of 
belonging are central to our purpose.” - Ernst and Young 2019 Audit Quality Report (EY 
2019)  
Accounting firms devote considerable resources to the acquisition, development, 
and motivation of qualified employees (e.g. KPMG 2018; McCabe 2018; Fisher 2019).1 
One key area of recent talent investment for audit firms is employee work-life balance, 
which is intended to increase employee job satisfaction. Academic literature in 
psychology and organizational behavior predicts that such investments should lead to 
improved organizational performance (e.g. Lewis and Heckman 2006; Heavey, 
Holwerda, and Hausknecht 2013). However, recent literature suggests that auditors 
employed by large accounting firms are unwilling to take advantage of work-life balance 
benefits due to concerns that the use of these firm-provided benefits could result in 
negative long-term career implications (Buchheit, Dalton, Harp, and Hollingsworth 
2016). This perception can be particularly detrimental to working parents, especially 
working mothers, in the audit profession who experience greater levels of work-life 
                                                 
1 I use ‘accounting firm’ and ‘audit firm’ interchangeably to refer to the large professional service 
organizations examined in my study. 
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conflict (Nouri and Parker 2020). As a result, the effectiveness of accounting firms’ 
employee talent investments, as well as overall organizational performance, may be 
limited without also promoting a culture that encourages employees to take advantage of 
firms’ talent investments. 
To directly confront these challenges some large accounting firms recently 
introduced equalized parental and family leave, which prior economic policy research 
predicts can foster a supportive organizational culture that is inclusive with regards to 
gender and family status (e.g. Bailey, Byker, Patel, and Ramnath 2019). Firm culture 
broadly encompasses the perceived acceptable and unacceptable behaviors within an 
organization, and includes expectations around acceptable workloads and work hours 
(Jenkins, Deis, Bedard and Curtis 2008). In line with this view of culture, equalized leave 
has the potential to improve the perceived acceptability of using firm-provided work 
flexibility, and to lead to more pronounced improvements to organizational effectiveness.  
To evaluate the role that a supportive organizational culture plays in audit 
effectiveness, I investigate whether the staggered adoption of these initiatives by three 
large U.S. accounting firms leads to increased audit quality. Further, I explore whether 
staff (i.e. non-partner) demographics directly impact audit quality and moderate the 
effectiveness of equalized parental leave. I focus on staff auditors as they are the 
individuals who directly collect and provide initial review of the audit evidence used to 
form audit opinions (e.g. Herrbach 2005; Lambert and Agoglia 2011), and while partner 
qualifications exhibit highly homogeneous backgrounds (Christensen, Glover, Omer, and 
Shelley 2016), greater heterogeneity may exist at the non-partner employee level.  
 3 
While research in psychology and management indicates that investments in 
employee talent, including the development of a supportive organizational culture, should 
lead to improved organizational performance (e.g. Ostroff 1992), recent empirical 
research on audit partner attributes casts doubt on the relevance of employee talent in 
achieving audit quality in large U.S. accounting firms (Aobdia, Siddiqui, and Vinelli 
2016; Lennox and Wu 2018; Burke, Hoitash and Hoitash 2019). This could minimize the 
relevance of organizational culture in the audit setting. Accordingly, evidence that 
organizational culture and employee demographics are associated with audit quality 
would shed new light on the role that individuals play in achieving audit effectiveness, 
and actions that audit firms and regulators can take to improve audit quality. In other 
words, such results would suggest that prior office-level audit quality findings could be 
driven by the individuals that make up audit offices. Additionally, finding that the 
staggered adoption of equalized parental leave results in higher audit quality would 
indicate that audit firm investment in talent is beneficial, but more effective with 
conducive firm culture. 
Given the mixed results in extant research on the relevance of audit employee 
talent, I first validate the association between staff attributes and audit quality. As in prior 
research, I measure audit quality using accrual quality and subsequent restatements (e.g. 
Beck, Francis, and Gunn 2018). While prior studies ascribe city-level workforce 
demographics to audit employees and find mixed results, I hand collect individual 
employee demographics for a subsample of audit offices to obtain a more precise 
estimate of individuals’ effect on audit quality. After controlling for audit office attributes 
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previously shown to impact audit quality I find that auditor qualifications, measured 
separately using graduate degree attainment and attendance of a highly ranked accounting 
program, are positively associated with audit quality. These results support the notion that 
human capital variation contributes to office-level audit quality, even within individual 
cities, and that continued firm talent investments are likely merited. Further, these 
findings show that direct employee data can provide unique insights that office-level 
measures may not be able to capture. 
I next apply a generalized difference-in-differences regression model to examine 
whether improved firm culture, as measured by the staggered adoption of equalized 
parental leave policies (i.e., equal parental leave provided to all employees, regardless of 
gender or primary caregiver status) at several Big 4 audit firms, impacts audit quality. 
PWC adopted such policies in 2014, while EY and Deloitte adopted similar policies in 
2016. While most audit firms offer generous parental leave benefits, economics and 
management literature suggest that equalized benefits may create a unique organizational 
culture that increases the perceived viability of parental leave, leading to improved 
organizational performance (Beauregard and Henry 2009; Baum and Ruhm 2016). 
However, this literature has provided little empirical evidence to measure the 
organizational impacts of such policies. The staggered adoption of these policies 
therefore presents an ideal setting to empirically validate economic theory and to evaluate 
whether the benefits of equalized parental leave can be obtained in the audit setting.  
In these analyses, I find that following the adoption of equalized parental leave 
policies by audit firms, audited financial statements are less likely to be misstated and 
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exhibit smaller abnormal discretionary accruals. These findings suggest that equalized 
leave improves organizational culture and results in improved audit quality. These results 
are robust to alternative specifications of the treatment variable as well as matched 
samples. In additional analyses, I find that the results are at least partly attributable to 
improved employee perceptions of work-life balance subsequent to the adoption of 
equalized leave policies. In particular, I find that Glassdoor ratings of audit firms improve 
subsequent to the adoption of equalized leave policies, with improvements most evident 
in employee views of work-life balance, and also find an increase in positive sentiment 
around parental leave subsequent to leave policy adoption. Together, these results 
indicate that talent investments that influence firm culture produce meaningful 
improvements in audit quality at large audit firms. 
To further validate my findings, I next investigate whether certain staff 
demographics moderate the effect of these equalized leave policies on audit quality. I 
identify offices with (1) greater constraints on the supply or demand for qualified auditors 
and/or (2) greater proportions of staff who may have higher work-life conflict. I find that 
the audit quality benefits of equalized leave are highest at offices located in cities with 
higher accountant and auditor industry concentration, and offices with fewer employees 
who have obtained a graduate degree. These results suggest that investments in audit 
employee talent and organizational culture are most impactful when employees have 
more alternative employment opportunities (greater auditor demand) or when the supply 
of qualified replacement audit employees is constrained.   
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Additionally, I find that the audit quality effect is greater at offices with a higher 
proportion of female employees, and offices located in cities with more households in 
which all parents are in the labor force. Thus, improved organizational culture via 
equalized parental leave is most effective for offices whose demographics are likely to be 
most impacted by actual or perceived improvements to work-life conflict. Finally, in 
further supplemental analyses I find no evidence that audit costs are greater following the 
adoption of equalized leave, which can alleviate concerns about the overall costs of 
implementing such policies.  
My study answers the call from practitioners and regulators for further research 
on attracting and retaining “the best and brightest students” to the auditing profession 
(Harris 2015). Specifically, this study should assist the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) with its efforts to improve existing Quality Control standards. 
I identify talent-related elements including variation in employee demographics and 
organizational work cultures that can influence audit quality at the firm and office level, 
even in large U.S. accounting firms. Likewise, my study speaks directly to the current 
research project by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), which seeks 
to re-evaluate human capital standards, including those related to employee diversity, 
engagement, and inclusion, in light of recent trends in societal values (SASB 2019). 
Taken together, such insights from my study can aid audit firms in tailoring future 
initiatives to increase the effectiveness of human capital investments.  
My study also contributes to academic research on the relevance of individual 
auditors in providing high quality audits, the impact of firm culture on organizational 
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performance, and factors that jointly determine office-level audit quality. I use a novel 
dataset of non-partner employee attributes in large US audit firms to overcome the lower 
precision of prior city-level workforce measures. Further, this study directly examines 
how a firm change in talent management and organizational culture may influence audit 
quality, and how employee demographics interact with these firm efforts in influencing 
the success of organizational human capital initiatives. These findings speak to the 
directions for future research noted by prior behavioral audit research such as Jenkins et 
al. (2008). Finally, recent economics research finds that the effectiveness of employee 
family leave policies may depend on the nature of such policies. This study employs a 
novel setting that reconciles and empirically supports these economic predictions. I 
provide evidence that firm efforts to enhance talent management through such tailored 
policies can result in meaningfully improved employee performance with a measurable 
effect on overall organizational performance.
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Chapter 2 
Background, Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Professional Standards Related to Auditor Talent and Audit Firm Culture 
Professional standards require auditor competency, objectivity, and motivation, 
but do not prescribe the specific actions necessary for achieving these requirements 
(PCAOB 2003; AICPA 2012). Furthermore, while audit firms provide centralized firm-
level oversight (Bedard, Deis, and Curtis 2008), local offices are granted significant 
autonomy in the administration of audit engagements (Reynolds and Francis 2000). 
Given this potential for variation in employment practices across accounting firms and 
offices, standard setters have recently emphasized the importance of effective talent 
management. In 2013, the PCAOB developed an Audit Quality Framework which stated 
that the employment of competent and talented people is “essential for audit quality” 
(PCAOB 2013). In this framework, the PCAOB proposed that audit quality indicators 
(AQIs) include tone at the top, which “drives a firm’s culture and personnel 
management”. In addition, the PCAOB included firm governance and culture in its 
concept release that explores revisions to existing quality control standards (PCAOB 
2019). The 2019 Audit Quality Framework from the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ), 
with input from practitioners, similarly notes that “culture influences attitudes and 
behaviors … which are critical to audit quality”, and specifically identifies the 
importance of initiatives around inclusiveness (CAQ 2019).  
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2.2. Prior Research Related to Employee Talent and Audit Quality 
Prior research documents inter-office audit quality variation due to audit office 
and firm size, and industry expertise (e.g. Ferguson, Francis, and Stokes 2003; Francis 
and Yu 2009; Choi, Kim, Kim and Zang 2010; Reichelt and Wang 2010). However, 
while regulators suggest that culture and talent management policies are important for 
audit quality, recent research on audit partners finds mixed results that cast doubt on the 
relevance of individual auditor talent on audit effectiveness. In particular, this literature 
examines whether partner attributes can differentially impact audit clients’ financial 
reporting (Knechel, Vanstraelen, and Zerni 2015; Lennox and Wu 2018) and finds, for 
example, that partner attributes impact audit fees (Zerni 2012; Goodwin and Wu 2014; 
Aobdia et al. 2016). However, while Gul, Wu, and Yang (2013) find that partner 
attributes are associated with audit quality variation in the Chinese setting, other recent 
studies (Aobdia et al. 2016; Burke et al. 2019) document no such relation in the U.S. 
Thus, firm-level oversight and quality control may be sufficient to achieve high audit 
quality in large U.S. audit firms, which could cast doubt on the relevance of employee 
talent in the audit setting. Nevertheless, while prior research has focused on partner-level 
attributes due to the recent disclosure of Form AP in the U.S., audit firms’ talent concerns 
largely center on non-partner staff (Whitehouse 2014).  
Recent research examines the relevance of non-partner attributes on audit quality, 
however, the findings are inconsistent. Beck et al. (2018) and Lee, Naiker, and Stewart 
(2019) ascribe city-level attributes to accounting offices, and find that variation in city-
specific labor demographics such as increased workforce education characteristics are 
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associated with improved audit quality; however, their results are mixed when examining 
Big 4 audit firms. Further, other research concludes that such improvements to audit 
quality are driven by the quality of client accounting personnel rather than external 
auditors (Call, Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Moon 2017; Bills, Huang, Lin, and Wood 2019; 
Reville, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2019). Recently, Nagy, Sherwood, and Zimmerman (2019) 
find that the availability of licensed firm personnel is associated with office audit quality, 
which supports the notion that non-partner employees are relevant to audit quality.  
Investments in talent and organizational culture are unlikely to influence audit 
effectiveness if staff attributes do not influence audit quality. In other words, if firm-level 
controls ensure high audit quality regardless of audit human capital, efforts to improve 
firm culture should have no impact on audit quality. While these recent academic studies 
suggest that audit staff attributes may help to explain audit quality, uncertainty remains 
due to potential alternative explanations. Therefore, as a foundation to my key research 
objective I begin by validating that a significant association exists between non-partner 
employee attributes and audit quality in large accounting firms, and pose the following 
signed hypothesis: 
H1: Staff auditor attributes are associated with office-level audit quality. 
2.3. Organizational Culture: Prior Research  
Prior literature broadly defines organizational culture as the shared basic 
assumptions for acceptable and unacceptable behavior among organizational members, 
and includes shared perceptions of “who is in and who is out of the group” (Jenkins et al. 
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2008; Schein 2010). Organizational culture includes perceptions of ethical behavior as 
well as perceptions of acceptable workloads and work hours, including the use of flexible 
work arrangements. The matching of organizational culture with individual values and 
needs can influence employees’ perceived level of belonging and inclusion, and overall 
job satisfaction (Brewer 2003; Jenkins et al. 2008; Shore, Randel, Chung, Dean, Ehrhart, 
and Singh 2011). Further, extant research in psychology and management supports the 
expectation that a culture that aligns with employee values and needs for inclusion can 
lead to improved organizational commitment and overall job performance (Wallach 
1983; Kearney and Gebert 2009; Shore et al. 2011).  
Although organizational culture is identified as a key concern by audit regulators 
and practitioners, prior studies do not directly examine how efforts to build a supportive 
culture impact audit quality. Prior research notes that large audit firms have a 
commercialized culture “with an intense focus on revenue generation, profitability, and 
the need to oversee and exert control over professionals” (Buchheit, Dalton, Harp, and 
Hollingsworth 2016). The high workloads in auditing can lead to overall job 
dissatisfaction, as well as increased employee burnout and turnover (Albrecht, Brown, 
and Field 1981; Carcello, Copeland, Hermanson, and Turner 1991; Persellin, Schmidt, 
Vandervelde, and Wilkins 2019), which psychology and management research suggests 
can negatively impact organizational performance (Heavey et al. 2013). Recent 
descriptive audit findings support these predictions (Stice, Stice, and White 2017; Khavis 
and Krishnan 2019). While prior behavioral research examines firm culture, it largely 
focuses on firm culture related to ethical behavior and the tradeoff between audit quality 
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and revenue generation (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2008). While this literature recognizes that 
flexible work arrangements may impact organizational culture, it does not evaluate how 
such arrangements impact audit effectiveness. Thus, studying how firm efforts to 
improve culture can impact audit quality builds on this prior literature and provides 
evidence that is relevant to regulators and practitioners. 
2.4. The Effect of Organizational Culture on Audit Quality: Examining Parental 
Leave  
In light of the commercialized culture present in audit firms, excessive work-
family conflict is one of the most frequent reasons cited for exiting public accounting 
(Rhode, Sorensen, and Lawler 1977; Hooks, Thomas, and Stout 1997). Big 4 
professionals experience higher levels of work-family conflict and burnout than 
professionals in industry or smaller firms (Buchheit et al. 2016), while women and those 
who have at least one child are even more likely to exhibit work-family conflict (Nouri 
and Parker 2020). Further, due to firm culture Big 4 auditors are less likely than non-Big 
4 auditors to believe that they could use benefits intended to improve work-life balance 
without negatively impacting career progression (Buchheit et al. 2016). Thus, despite 
firms’ talent investments, these individuals are more likely to face greater challenge in 
balancing work-family conflict with inherent psychological need for inclusion. Therefore, 
a culture that is supportive and inclusive to groups that experience these greater levels of 
work-life conflict may improve audit quality (Dalton, Cohen, Harp, and McMillan 2014). 
Work-life balance has recently received increased attention in the wider economics 
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literature due to debate around parental leave policies’ impact on societal and business 
outcomes. The Center for Economic and Policy Research found that expanded parental 
leave policies may improve employee productivity, performance, and morale, and 
increase employee retention (Gault, Hartmann, Hegewisch, Milli, and Reichlin 2014; 
Appelbaum and Milkman 2015; Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel 2013; Baum and 
Ruhm (2016). Nevertheless, such studies have been unable to identify a direct impact of 
these policies on organizational performance.  
The CAQ’s Audit Quality Framework (CAQ 2019) notes that incentives are an 
important part of firm culture. Therefore, in light of work-family conflict concerns, large 
audit firms offer generous maternity leave and flexible work arrangements and 
consistently earn recognition for such policies (e.g. Working Mother 2018). However, as 
previously noted, the prevailing firm culture among Big 4 auditors has minimized the 
perceived viability of using these benefits without negatively impacting career 
progression (Buchheit et al. 2016). Accordingly, “the presence of supportive managers 
and organizational climates may be at least as if not more important [than work-life 
balance policies] in decreasing [work-life] conflict” (Beauregard and Henry 2009). 
Recent economics literature suggests that ‘equalized’ benefits may be a necessary policy 
feature to create such a culture that avoids “differential employer discrimination against 
[working] mothers giving birth” (England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2016; Bailey et al. 
2019). Therefore, the supportive culture fostered by equalized leave may lead to greater 
participation in such programs, and more significant organizational performance impacts. 
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Equalized employee leave policies that grant, among various other benefits, firm-
provided parental leave equal for all parents regardless of gender or caregiver status were 
adopted in recent years by PWC (2014), EY (2016), and Deloitte (2016) (Deloitte 2016; 
EY 2016; Bellstrom 2016; Elejalde-Ruiz 2016). ‘Equalized’ policies had not been 
announced by other Big 4 or mid-market firms as of 2018.2 In post-implementation review, 
the adopting firms found that these policies have contributed to improved hiring and 
retention (Douglas 2018; Stych 2019), with notable increases in the percentage of fathers 
who took parental leave and a significant reduction in female employee turnover (Bolden-
Barrett 2019) consistent with the expectations of prior literature (Almer and Kaplan 2002). 
However, the impact of such efforts on audit quality has yet to be empirically examined. 
Economic predications suggest that such leave policies may lead to improved productivity; 
however, workforce disruption from greater use of parental leave could instead impair 
productivity. Thus, I present the following hypothesis in the null: 
H2: Equalized firm-level parental leave initiatives do not lead to improved audit 
quality. 
                                                 
2 The parental leave time provided pre- and post- adoption of expanded leave policies varies by firm. 
Further some firms (e.g. BDO and Grant Thornton) implemented policies during my sample period that 
extended, but did not equalize, parental leave. My study focuses on equalized leave, in line with recent 
economic research and as such, variation in leave time or the adoption of non-equalized policies creates 
noise that should bias against my findings.   
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2.5 When is Equalized Leave Effective for Achieving Improvements in Audit 
Quality?  
In addition to directly influencing audit quality, employee demographics are 
likely to impact the effectiveness of organizational efforts including equalized parental 
leave. Specifically, audit employees’ job satisfaction and organizational commitment 
(employees’ psychological attachment to their employer organization) are mechanisms 
through which equalized parental leave affects audit quality (Nouri and Parker 2020). A 
moderating relationship between office demographics and equalized parental leave 
effectiveness may illustrate how auditor, office, and firm factors interact to determine 
office-level audit quality. Further, it can provide additional evidence to validate that the 
equalized parental leave findings result from talent investments rather than some 
alternative firm-level factors.  
Given prior literature indicates that employees of large audit firms are subject to 
high levels of work-life conflict (Buchheit et al. 2016), audit offices with employees who 
experience greater conflict as well as lower perceived inclusion (i.e. women and working 
parents) may benefit more from improvements to organizational culture in large audit firms 
(Nouri and Parker 2020). As previously discussed, economic predictions suggest that these 
individuals are likely to experience the greatest benefits from the greater inclusion provided 
by equalized leave. Conversely, the increased work disruptions caused by expanded leave 
policies may negatively impact audit quality. Given these competing predictions, I explore 
how variation in city-level rates of dual-income households and office-level female 
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employment rates moderate the impact of equalized parental leave policies on audit quality, 
and predict the following unsigned hypothesis: 3 
H3a: The impact of firm-level parental leave initiatives on office-level audit quality 
is moderated by local office work-life conflict.  
Equalized parental leave benefits may also improve organizational commitment 
through increased emotional attachment to the organization or an increased perceived 
sacrifice from changing employment (Nouri and Parker 2020). Such effects may be of 
greater importance when employees are inherently at risk of reduced organizational 
commitment due to local labor market constraints. Specifically, a larger set of alternative 
employment opportunities (i.e. labor demand) is positively associated with employee 
turnover intention (Lawler and Suttle 1973; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, and Topolnytsky 
2002). In other words, if local employment in accounting and auditing professions is high, 
audit offices may be at risk of higher employee turnover and may benefit more from 
equalized parental leave. On the other hand, an ample supply of qualified labor may reduce 
turnover intentions or the negative effect of employee turnover on audit quality. That is, 
offices geographically located in areas with a higher proportion of qualified employees 
may be less constrained in the ability to attract or retain such talent. Given these 
                                                 
3 I use ‘dual-income’ households colloquially to refer to households in which all parents are in the labor 
force, in line with US Census data definitions. 
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expectations from research in psychology and organizational behavior, I present the 
following signed hypothesis: 
H3b: The impact of firm-level parental leave initiatives on office-level audit quality 





3.1. Effect of Employee Qualification on Audit Quality 
To test H1 I hand-collect employee demographics on non-partner auditors in a 
subset of Big 4 and large, mid-market audit offices, as further discussed in Chapter 4. I use 
these audit employee demographic data to examine whether variation in auditor 
qualification is associated with audit quality. For this analysis, I estimate the following 
model:  
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸
+ 𝑀𝑆𝐴_𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
The dependent variable in Model (1), AudQual, takes one of two proxies for audited 
company i in year t to allow for “triangulating” the construct of audit quality, as 
recommended by DeFond and Zhang (2014). The first dependent variable proxy, ABS_DA, 
measures abnormal discretionary accruals for company i in year t, calculated using the 
modified Jones model, controlling for firm performance (Jones 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005).4 Consistent with prior studies (e.g. 
                                                 
4 The absolute value of abnormal discretionary accruals is estimated using the following equation, 
estimated by industry and year, and requiring at least 10 observations per industry-year: 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(1/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 − 𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑃𝐸) +  𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴) + 𝜀 
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Beck, Gunn, and Hallman 2019), the second dependent variable proxy, RESTATEMENT, 
is an indicator variable equal to one if company i subsequently restates its 10-K financial 
statements filed in year t, and zero otherwise.5 See Appendix A for detailed variable 
descriptions and data sources.  
The key independent variable of interest, Office_Qualif takes one of two separate 
proxies for average office audit employee qualification. The first, PCT_MASTERS, 
measures the ex post percentage of audit employees in the local accounting firm office with 
a graduate degree for company i. The second proxy, PCT_TOP_50 measures the ex post 
percentage of audit employees who attended a top ranked accounting program.6 I include 
additional company and auditor control variables used in prior research that investigates 
earnings and audit quality (e.g. Defond and Zhang 2014; Beck et al. 2019). Discussion and 
rationale for the inclusion of these variables is included below and all variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
First, I control for company characteristics as in prior studies (e.g. Francis and Yu 
2009). I control for size using the natural logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS), for risk 
with leverage (LEV) measured as total debt scaled by total assets, and for profitability with 
LOSS_IB, an indicator variable equal to one when net income is negative, and zero 
otherwise (Biddle, Hilary and Verdi 2009). I control for investment opportunities with 
                                                 
5 Aobdia (2019) finds that unsigned discretionary accruals are positively associated with PCAOB Part I 
deficiency findings, while restatements are associated with both Part I deficiency findings and internal 
inspection outcomes.  
6 Top ranked accounting program are defined as any program ranked in the top 50 in the Public Accounting 
Report in any of 2017-2019. My conclusions are consistent when using alternative measures such as also 
including top ranked business programs per the US News and World Report, and limiting to top 25 ranked 
programs.  
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TOBINQ measured as the market value of equity, plus total assets, less the book value of 
equity, scaled by lagged total assets. Sales growth (SALEGTH) is the annual percentage 
change in total revenue, while OCF measures operating cash flow scaled by total assets. I 
also control for variability in cash flows (STD_OCF) and revenue (STD_REV). Finally, in 
the discretionary accruals models, I include lagged absolute total accruals 
(LAGABSACCRUALS), while in the restatement models I include an indicator variable 
(PY_RESTATED) equal to one if the prior year 10-K was restated. 
I next control for auditor attributes previously shown to influence audit quality 
(Francis and Yu 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Beck et al. 2019). I control for audit office 
size using the natural logarithm of total annual audit fees for the opinion signing audit 
office (LNOFFICE), and for the length of the auditor-client relationship with TENURE, an 
indicator variable equal to one if the audit firm-client tenure is less than or equal to three 
years. I also include BIGN, an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is a Big 4 audit 
firm. Finally, INDEXPERT is an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is the MSA-
industry leader, calculated using market share of audit fees by 2-digit SIC code (Ferguson 
et al. 2003), while OPINION is an indicator variable equal to one if a going concern opinion 
was issued in the current year. 
In all specifications of my analyses, I include industry, year, and MSA fixed effects. 
First, consistent with prior audit literature (e.g. Beck et al. 2018; Beck et al. 2019), I include 
industry fixed effects to account for unobserved time-invariant characteristics of audit 
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clients.7 Year fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity in audit quality across 
time. Finally, I include MSA fixed effects to control for city-level workforce demographics 
suggested in prior literature to impact audit quality and jointly attributable to auditors and 
audit clients.  
3.2. Effect of Improved Organizational Culture on Audit Quality 
 For tests of H2, H3a and H3b, I use the staggered adoption of equalized parental 
leave policies among three audit firms to examine whether audit firm organizational culture 
impacts audit quality. Specifically, I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit 
regressions in the following generalized difference-in-differences model: 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
The dependent variable in Model (2), AudQual, is measured using ABS_DA and 
RESTATEMENT as previously defined. The independent variable of interest, LEAVEit, is 
an indicator variable set equal to one if company i was audited by a firm that had adopted 
expanded parental leave policies by year t, and zero otherwise.8 Parental leave policies that 
equalized the amount of firm-provided parental leave, as previously defined, were adopted 
                                                 
7 Consistent with prior studies, I use the 2-digit SIC for industry fixed effects. However, for robustness, I 
likewise perform my analyses using audit client company fixed effects (untabulated), which produces 
consistent findings.  
8 I require that an audit firm’s equalized leave policies were enacted at least one quarter prior to the 
company’s fiscal year end date. My findings are similar for alternative specifications for the independent 
variable of interest, such as defining the LEAVE based on audits that occurred in the calendar year 
following adoption of equalized leave.  
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by PWC in 2014, by EY in 2016, and by Deloitte in 2016. In all regressions, I include 
industry, year, and audit firm fixed effects. Industry fixed effects account for unobserved 
time-invariant characteristics of audit clients,9 while year fixed effects control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in audit quality that occurs across time. Finally, given variation 
in the adoption of parental leave policies occurs at the audit firm level, I include audit firm 
fixed effects to control for unobserved audit firm-specific factors that may impact audit 
quality.  
In sum, my research design functions as a difference-in-differences design in which 
company years where the engaged audit firm had not adopted equalized parental leave 
serve as the control group for company years where the engaged audit firm had adopted 
such policies. Thus, in Model (2) the coefficient, β1, represents the difference-in-
differences estimate, which evaluates the average treatment effect of improved talent 
management for the treatment group relative to the control group. In my analyses (see 
Chapter 4), I first exclude all time-varying control variables to ensure the consistency of 
my estimates. Subsequently, I include company, auditor, and local labor control variables 
used in prior research that investigates earnings and audit quality (e.g. Beck et al. 2019; 
Defond and Zhang 2014). Company and auditor controls are as previously defined in 
Model (1), however BIGN is omitted due to the inclusion of audit firm fixed effects. 
Discussion of additional local labor controls and rationale for the inclusion of these 
variables in Model (2) is included below and defined in detail in Appendix A.  
                                                 
9 Consistent with prior studies on audit quality, I use the 2-digit SIC for industry fixed effects. For 
robustness, I also perform my analyses using audit client company fixed effects (untabulated), which 
produces consistent findings.  
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 I predict that the effect of equalized leave policies varies based on city-level factors, 
therefore I include city controls shown in prior studies to impact audit quality (e.g. Beck et 
al. 2018). First, I control for the relative size of the accountant and auditor workforce in a 
MSA using the U.S. Department of Labor’s “labor quotient” (LOC_QUOTIENT).10 
Consistent with prior studies, I also include LANDGRANT, an indicator variable equal to 
one when a land grant university is present in the city to proxy for a highly educated local 
workforce (Moretti 2004). Finally, given socioeconomic changes could impact audit 
quality, I additionally include POP_PCT_CHANGE, the five-year percentage change in 
population for each MSA.  
 
                                                 
10 MSA demographic data are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 
(ACS), and uses the five-year survey estimate (2013-2018) consistent with Beck et al. (2018). 
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Chapter 4  
Sample Construction and Empirical Results 
4.1. Data 
4.1.1. Office Demographic Sample Construction 
 To test H1, I collect publicly disclosed demographic data of individual auditors 
employed in a subset of Big 4 and mid-market audit offices.11 To select offices for 
analysis, I identify all MSAs that contain a single audit office from each of the Big 4 
accounting firms, and require that “Book of Lists” data are available to allow for 
validation of hand-collected data.12 This leaves 23 MSAs for my analyses (See Appendix 
B). For each Big 4 and mid-market office in the selected MSAs, I hand collect education 
and professional experience data on individual audit employees. I use a process similar to 
Reville et al. (2019) and search publicly accessible social networking platforms for all 
non-partner individuals employed in external financial statement auditing positions in the 
selected offices as of December 31, 2019.13 For each audit individual, I note the 
employee’s name, graduation dates, degree-granting schools, and highest degree attained. 
                                                 
11 I include Grant Thornton, BDO and RSM in my sample as Non-Big 4/mid-market auditors. Although 
these firms are smaller than the Big 4 firms, they have a substantial national presence, with similar 
resources and local labor market reliance as the Big 4 audit firms, as noted in prior literature (e.g. Beck et 
al. 2018).  
12 The “Book of Lists” is a local business publication that contains data including local professionals 
employed by individual accounting firm offices in each MSA. Such data have been used in prior audit 
studies exploring firm market share and other office-specific characteristics (e.g. Keune, Mayhew, and 
Schmidt 2016; Nagy et al. 2018). 
13 Specifically, I first require that an individual’s job title or description include ‘Audit’ or ‘Assurance’. I 
then manually filter to exclude individuals from other service lines including Tax, Consulting, Risk or IT 
Assurance, and Advisory practices. I collect demographic data only for the year 2019 due to the challenge 
in accurately identifying auditors previously employed by specific offices. 
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Using these data, I infer employee gender (used in analyses of H3a below),14 whether an 
employee graduated from a highly ranked school, and total post-graduation years of work 
experience.  
 In total, I collect demographic data for 12,342 individual audit employees. I then 
require that individual employee profiles list a graduation date and location, and have at 
least 50 social connections. Because long-tenured employees may be less likely to have 
updated profile data, I also exclude employees with experience greater than seven years.15 
Finally, to avoid biasing effects from outliers, I require at least 10 employee observations 
per office. After applying these filters, 9,292 employee profiles from 144 audit offices 
remain in my sample. I use these data to calculate office-level averages for the percentage 
of employees that have a graduate degree (PCT_MASTERS), or attended a top ranked 
accounting program (PCT_TOP_50).16 I next identify audits performed by these offices 
from 2017-2018. My sample includes all non-financial U.S. firms in Audit Analytics 
audited by Big 4 or mid-market auditors (as previously defined), and is limited to 
observations with sufficient data in Audit Analytics and Compustat to construct the 
variables to perform my analyses. My sample begins in 2017 to minimize potential 
                                                 
14 To assign a gender to each employee, I calculate the probability of a given name being male or female 
using 85 years of Social Security Administration data on baby names and genders (available at 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/limits.html). I calculate the probability of a given gender for a given 
name as (number of individuals of a given gender)/(total number of people with given name), and assign 
the most likely gender to each name. The average probability of correct gender classification in my sample 
is approximately .97. My results are consistent when excluding individuals with a probability of correct 
classification lower than .75.  
15 Employee promotion to “Senior Manager” or equivalent roles begins at this experience. While I exclude 
these profiles to improve data reliability, my conclusions are consistent when including such individuals in 
my sample.  
16 I also calculate the percentage of employees that are female (PCT_FEMALE), and average years of 
experience (AVG_EXP). These variables are used in tests of H3 and in supplemental analyses, respectively.  
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office-level changes in employee attributes over time and ends in 2018 to allow sufficient 
time for misstatements to be revealed by a subsequently announced restatement. My final 
sample includes 1,704 firm-year observations that meet all filtering criteria (see Table 1 
Panel A). 
4.1.2. Difference in Differences Sample Construction 
 Table 1 Panel B documents the sample selection criteria and sample size attrition 
for the difference-in-differences analyses used in testing H2, H3a and H3b. The sample 
begins with all non-financial U.S. firms in the Audit Analytics Opinions Database audited 
by Big 4 or mid-market auditors (as previously defined) from 2010 to 2018. The sample 
period begins in 2010 due to data inconsistencies in US Census ACS data prior to 2010, 
and ends in 2018 to allow sufficient time for misstatements to be revealed by a 
subsequently announced restatement. I merge city-level variables obtained from the US 
Census ACS database and the US Department of Labor, and again limit the sample to 
observations with sufficient data to perform my regressions. Finally, to mitigate additional 
potential confounding effects I exclude companies with multiple auditors in any year of the 
sample period, and require that more than five consecutive periods of data are available for 
each company in my sample. My final sample includes 15,626 firm-year observations that 
meet all filtering criteria. 
 Table 1 Panel C shows the sample composition by Fama-French 12 industries for 
the full sample, as well as treatment and control firm years. As previously described, 
treatment company years are those in which a company was audited by a firm that had 
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adopted equalized parental leave, while control company years include all other 
observations. As shown in Table 1, the breakout by industry for treatment and control firms 
is similar, with no significant deviations in industry composition between the two groups. 
Overall, there are no differences greater than 3.6% (Wholesale, Retail and Some Services) 
between the two groups, and approximately seventy percent of both treatment and control 
observations are in the same five industries, which supports the notion that economic 
fundamentals are similar between treatment and control observations.  
4.2. Descriptive Statistics and Parallel Trends 
 I include descriptive statistics for the sample of firms used for tests of H1 in Table 
2, Panel A, while Table 3, Panel A presents the correlation matrix of variables used in 
this sample of firm years. On average, observations in this sample were audited by offices 
with approximately 61 (51) percent of employees who possess a master’s degree 
(graduated from a highly ranked accounting program).17 Additionally, the correlations 
between employee education background measures and office level characteristics are 
generally low. While the office-level employee graduation program ranking is modestly 
correlated with audit office size (r = .16), the correlations between employee education 
background measures and office industry expertise are generally quite small (r < .10). As 
such, the effect of employee education on audit quality is unlikely to be driven by 
                                                 
17 In untabulated analyses I compare the means of these office-level variables, as well as gender 
(PCT_FEMALE), between treatment and control offices of Big 4 firms as defined in my difference-in-
differences analyses. I find no statistically significant difference between treatment and control offices, 
which suggests that the adoption of equalized parental leave policies did not systematically change such 
demographics of audit firm offices. 
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inherent pre-existing office-level attributes. Additionally, while office-level degree 
attainment is positively correlated (untabulated) with city-level education attributes used 
in prior literature (e.g. Beck et al. 2018), the correlation is small (r < .10) and statistically 
insignificant.18 Thus, direct employee data can provide inferences that are meaningfully 
more precise than publicly accessible city data. 
Table 2, Panel B includes descriptive statistics for the full sample used in the 
difference in differences analyses, while Panel C includes descriptive statistics for 
treatment and control firm-year observations in this sample. Table 3, Panel B presents the 
correlation matrix of variables used in this sample. Given the treatment group does not 
include the audits of mid-tier firms, unsurprisingly the treatment group includes client 
firms that are on average larger, and audited by larger firms, industry experts, and firms 
with longer tenure. However, the city-level attributes are quite similar between the two 
groups with statistical differences noted only in population changes (p < 0.05). 
Nevertheless, I control for these observable differences in my analyses. Further, I note 
that identification in a difference in differences design relies on the parallel trends 
assumption in pre-treatment periods, and does not require treatment and control firms to 
be similar ex ante (Roberts and Whited 2013).19  
                                                 
18 Beck et al (2018) use ACS survey data to calculate the percentage of people with a bachelor's degree or 
higher in the MSA where the signing auditor office is located. I similarly construct this variable in 
evaluating the correlation between city- and office-level demographics. 
19 Nevertheless, I also consider whether pre-existing differences between treatment and control firms may 
drive the results using a matched sample as discussed below. Similarly, if results were consistent using a 
false event date, it would indicate that systematic differences between treatment and control observations 
drive the results. I find no effect when using a pseudo-event date (see Chapter 5), which is inconsistent with 
such an alternative explanation. 
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I validate the parallel trend assumption by replacing LEAVE in Model (2) with 
event-time indicators. I omit year t-1 as the benchmark group because the inclusion of all 
event-year indicators in the regression results in perfect collinearity. As such, this design 
effectively maps out the treatment effect over time, with deviations from 0 indicating the 
magnitude of the effect between the treatment and control groups. Figures 1 and 2 plot the 
regression coefficients and confidence intervals of interest for abnormal discretionary 
accruals and restatements, respectively. Prior to the adoption of equalized parental leave 
policies in year t, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The 
improvements in audit quality (reduced discretionary accruals and restatements) become 
apparent beginning in year t, with some fluctuations in year t+1, potentially due to the 
initial disruptive effect of employees actually taking leave. However, the trend toward 
improved audit quality persists through year t+2. Based in these analyses, I conclude that 
the parallel trend assumption is met in my setting. 
4.3. Do Office-Specific Demographics Influence Audit Quality? 
Table 4 presents the results to test H1. In columns (1) and (2), I find that the 
coefficient for PCT_MASTERS is negative, but only statistically significant for 
restatements (p < 0.05). On the other hand, in columns (3) and (4), I find that the 
coefficient for PCT_TOP_50 is negative and statistically significant for abnormal 
accruals (p < 0.01). Together, these results support H1, and suggest that, even in large 
audit firms, individual auditors’ attributes are associated with variation in audit quality 
above and beyond office size or industry expertise. Additionally, these findings show the 
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value of using multiple proxies to evaluate the effect of audit office employee 
demographics on audit outcomes. Finally, in connection with the key focus of this study, 
these results suggest that investments in talent and organizational culture may lead to 
higher audit quality.  
4.4. Does Equalized Parental Leave Lead to Improved Audit Quality? 
Tables 5 and 6 presents the results to test H2. In Table 5, I find that coefficient on 
LEAVE is negative and marginally significant, which indicates that the absolute value of 
abnormal discretionary accruals is reduced between .045 (p < 0.10) and .049 (p < 0.10) for 
treatment firm-years. Similarly, in Table 5, I find that the log-odds of restatements is 
reduced between .441 (p < 0.01) and .536 (p < 0.01) for treatment firm-years, which 
equates to an approximate 4 percent lower probability of restatement for treatment 
observations.20  In regression (1) of Tables 5 and 6, I include only fixed effects without 
additional control variables to alleviate concerns about the “bad controls” problem. That 
is, if control variables also change in response to the treatment, then their inclusion in a 
regression that examines the treatment effect could introduce econometric bias (Angrist 
and Pischke 2008). Regressions (2) and (3) in Tables 5 and 6 present the same results when 
client, firm- and auditor-level controls are included. I find that both abnormal accruals and 
restatements decrease after the adoption of equalized parental leave policies. Additionally, 
                                                 
20 I convert the log-odds ratio produced by logit models to changes in probability by calculating the 
difference between (p(RESTATEMENT = 1 | LEAVE = 0)) – (p(RESTATEMENT = 1 | LEAVE = 1)); where 
p(Y = 1 | LEAVE) = e(β0 + β1*LEAVE)/(1+e(β0 + β1*LEAVE)). If I instead estimate Model 2 using a linear 
probability model, I find a coefficient on LEAVE that estimates a 3 percent lower probability of restatement 
(p < 0.01), which further illuminates an estimated range of the treatment effect. 
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the coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior literature.21 
Given my conclusions are unchanged using models with and without controls, the bad 
controls problem does not appear to bias my findings. Finally, Regression (4) in Tables 5 
and 6 replaces industry fixed effects with company fixed effects to show that the results 
are robust to alternative model specifications.22 As such, my results provide evidence that 
equalized leave policies improve audit quality, which rejects H2. 
4.5. Do Office Demographics Impact the Effectiveness of Talent Management 
Investments? 
4.5.1 Do City-Level Rates of Parental Employment Moderate the Impact of Equalized 
Parental Leave? 
To further validate the results from tests of H2, and to test the moderating role 
that workforce demographics play in equalized leave policies, I perform cross sectional 
tests that re-estimate Model (2) using subsets of data based on city- and office-level 
employee demographics. Given the strong association between restatements and audit 
process deficiencies (Aobdia 2019), I present these analyses using restatements as the 
measure of audit quality.23  
                                                 
21 I find only limited evidence of statistical correlation between city demographics and audit quality, which 
could call into question the relevance of auditor qualification in large audit firms when examined using 
city-level data. These findings further show the importance of using direct employee data when possible as 
I do in my tests of H1. Nevertheless, I further explore the moderating role of such demographics in my tests 
of H3 below. 
22 I re-perform these analysis including only Big 4 firms as a supplemental analysis in Chapter 5 to 
evaluate whether firm size drives these findings and find similar results. 
23 In untabulated analyses I re-perform these tests using abnormal discretionary accruals as the dependent 
measure, and the conclusions are unchanged.  
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To test H3a, I re-perform the diff-in-diff analysis after splitting my sample on 
city-level workforce demographics to identify offices where employees are more likely to 
be influenced by equalized leave. First, I group firm-year observations into low and high 
rates of dual income households using the top and bottom terciles of local MSA-level 
rates of children with all parents in the workforce. Offices located in cities with high rates 
of dual income are more likely to have employees subject to increased work-life conflict, 
who may be influenced by the improved culture and flexibility provided by equalized 
leave policies. This may strengthen the improvement seen in audit quality subsequent to 
leave policy adoption. On the other hand, offices in cities with high rates of dual income 
households may instead experience a negative audit quality impact due to increased 
workforce disruptions from a higher number of employees taking parental leave. 
I re-estimate Model (2) separately for firm-years in the low and high dual income 
rate samples in Table 7, Panel A. I find that the treatment effect is significant in both 
subsamples; however, a Chow test of equality of coefficients shows that the magnitude of 
the coefficient on LEAVE is greater (p < 0.05) in cities with high rates of dual income 
households. Thus, the impact of equalized leave on audit quality is greater when employees 
are more likely to benefit from the improved culture and flexibility provided by equalized 
leave. These findings support H3a and indicate that local parental employment rates 
moderate the effectiveness of equalized employee leave policies. Additionally, these 
results provide evidence to suggest that equalized leave in fact drives the findings in H2.   
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4.5.2. Is the Impact of Expanded Benefits Affected by Local Demand for Accountants 
and Auditors? 
Improved organizational culture may have a greater impact in areas where audit 
employees have a larger number of local alternative employment opportunities. 
Therefore, to test H3b, I partition my sample into terciles by local location quotient, 
which measures the relative proportion of the local workforce made up by accountants 
and auditors. A higher location quotient would indicate a larger relative employment 
opportunity set for accountants and auditors in the city where each audit office is located. 
I once again re-estimate Model (2) separately for observations in the low and high 
location quotient samples.  
Table 7, Panel B presents the results of this cross-sectional analysis. I find that the 
coefficient on LEAVE is negative and significant (p < 0.01) in the high location quotient 
group, which indicates improved audit quality subsequent to the adoption of equalized 
leave. On the other hand, in the low location quotient group the coefficient on LEAVE is 
not statistically significant. Further, the Chow test statistic shows that the magnitude of the 
coefficient in the high location quotient group is significantly greater (p < 0.05). Taken 
together, these results indicate that the relevance of expanded benefits in audit firms is 
moderated by local labor opportunities, consistent with H3b.  
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4.5.3. Do Office-Specific Gender Demographics Moderate the Impact of Equalized 
Leave? 
To further test H3a and H3b I merge the hand-collected, ex post, employee 
demographic data used in tests of H1 to my full difference in differences sample used in 
H2, and remove observations for offices not included in my hand-collected sample. This 
results in a sample size of 8,306 company-year observations. First, to complement my 
previous findings on the moderating effect of local parental dual employment rates, I 
explore whether office-level gender demographics moderate the effect of equalized leave 
on audit quality. Specifically, a key benefit of equalized leave noted in prior literature is 
improved female employee job performance due to a reduction in the real or perceived 
“motherhood penalty” (Dunatchik and Özcan 2019). Accordingly, if this key feature in 
my setting is relevant, then audit quality improvements should be greater in offices with a 
higher proportion of female employees. To test this, I split my sample into terciles based 
on the proportion of female audit staff in each office, and estimate Model (2) for the 
HIGH and LOW subsamples.  
Results from this analysis are presented in Table 8, Panel A. I find that the reduction 
in restatement likelihood is only significant in offices with a high proportion of female 
employees (p < 0.05). Additionally, these results show that, relative to offices with a lower 
proportion of female employees, the magnitude of the coefficient on LEAVE is greater for 
offices with a high proportion of female employee. A Chow test of equality further reveals 
that the difference in magnitude of these coefficients is also statistically significant (p < 
0.01). From these results, I infer that equalized leave is most impactful in offices where the 
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cultural impact of gender-neutral policies positively impacts a larger proportion of 
employees, which supports H3a. Further, in connection with my earlier findings on the 
impact of rates, this shows that both the perceived and actual improvements in 
organizational culture around leave flexibility can drive improvements in audit quality.24 
4.5.4. Do Office-Specific Qualification Demographics Moderate the Impact of 
Equalized Leave? 
Finally, I use PCT_MASTERS to proxy for the supply of highly qualified audit 
employees, and evaluate how auditor supply further moderates the impact of improved 
culture. That is, if an office is constrained on its supply of highly qualified talent (i.e. a 
lower proportion of employees who possess a graduate degree), improved retention 
resulting from equalized leave should have a greater impact on audit quality. To test this 
prediction, I split my sample into terciles based on PCT_MASTERS and re-estimate 
Model (2) separately for offices with a relatively high and low proportion of employees 
with a graduate degree. As shown in Table 8, Panel B, I find that the coefficient on 
LEAVE is of greater magnitude and only significant among offices in the LOW group, 
though a Chow test does not indicate statistical difference in coefficients between the 
groups. Nevertheless, these results provide some evidence in support of H3b and suggest 
                                                 
24 In untabulated analyses, I further find that the effect of equalized leave on audit quality is moderated by 
parental employment (dual income) only when female employment is also high in audit offices. That is, 
when splitting the sample on both office-level female employment and local parental employment rates, the 
coefficient on LEAVE is only negative and significant (p < 0.05), and of greater magnitude, when both 
female employment and dual income rates are high. These analyses further support that the findings of H2 
are driven by equalized leave adoption. 
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that improved talent management is most impactful on audit quality in offices where the 
supply of highly qualified talent is constrained. In combination with my previous finding, 
this shows how local labor supply and demand can jointly impact audit effectiveness.  
In sum, these analyses using both city-level and office-level demographics show 
how demographic factors jointly moderate the effectiveness of firm-level talent 
management efforts, and provides support for acceptance for H3a and H3b. Also of key 
importance, these results provide further evidence to validate rejection of H2, as the 
treatment effect would not be expected to predictably vary across office employee 
demographics if the results were due to some alternative firm factor. Finally, these findings 
jointly support the notion that talent management is relevant in producing high audit 
quality, with some benefits uniquely resulting from non-partner employees, and that audit 
employee attributes help to explain variation in office-level audit quality. 
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Chapter 5  
Additional Analyses 
5.1. Are the Results Due to Selection Effects or Pre-existing Differences? 
To address concerns of pre-existing differences in the sample of companies 
included in estimating my difference in differences model, I re-estimate Model (2) as in 
my tests of H2 using a matched sample. I first match firms on Fama-French 12 industries, 
size and year using coarsened exact matching (See Iacus, King, and Porro 2012), and 
randomly drop observations so that there are an equal number of treatment and control 
firms remaining in the sample. Table 9 presents the results from this analysis. The 
findings are consistent with my main results, as both abnormal accruals (p < 0.05) and 
restatements (p < 0.10) are reduced for treatment firm-years. Accordingly, my results are 
not driven by differences in the composition of industries, years, or the number of 
treatment and control firms.25  
To further analyze whether pre-existing differences drive my results I re-estimate 
Model (2) as in tests of H2 using a pseudo-event date. If my results are driven by systematic 
differences between the treatment and control firms, I should find similar results when 
using a different time period that doesn’t include the adoption of equalized parental leave 
                                                 
25 For further robustness, I use entropy balanced sampling, which applies a weight to each observation in 
order to balance the covariates of treatment and control firms on the first and second moments 
(Hainnmueller 2012). The results (untabulated) are likewise consistent with my previous analyses. 
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benefits. I use a sample period from 2005 through 2013 and use treatment timing within 
the pseudo-event period consistent with my original sample. 26 That is, in this pseudo-event 
analysis treatment occurs in 2008 for PwC and in 2010 for Deloitte and EY. Results from 
this pseudo-event analysis are shown in Table 10. I find no significant difference in audit 
quality between treatment and control firms, which indicates that systematic differences 
between treatment and control firms are not driving my results. In sum, my analyses are 
robust to matched sample as well as a pseudo-event test and are likely not driven by pre-
existing differences or selection effects. 
5.2. Are the Results Due to Audit Firm Differences? 
In my main analyses, I include company years audited by mid-market audit firms 
due to these firms’ similar resources relative to Big 4 audit firms. The inclusion of these 
firms improves the balance of treatment and control firm sample size. However, inherent 
differences in size and firm structure exist between Big 4 firms and mid-market firms. As 
such, it is possible that my findings could also be biased by the differences in these firms’ 
characteristics. In other words, if the results are driven by differences in Big 4 accounting 
firm firms relative to mid-market firms, there should be no treatment effect or post-
treatment trend when excluding mid-market firms from my analyses. Accordingly, I first 
re-perform my main tests related to H2 using Model (2) and include only Big 4 audit firms, 
                                                 
26 Because of limitations in data availability prior to 2010, I use post-2010 averages for these measures in 
the pseudo-event analysis. As noted Tables 4 and 5, these controls do not drive my results. Further, in 
untabulated analyses, I note that my conclusions are unchanged when omitting these variables from the 
pseudo-event analysis. 
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and present the results in Table 11. I find results that are negative and significant for both 
abnormal accruals (p < 0.10) and restatements (p < 0.05), with coefficient magnitudes 
consistent with the findings of my main analyses. Similarly, Figures 3 and 4 show the 
graphical depiction of the parallel trends assumption, which is likewise consistent with the 
results in the main tests of H2. In both analyses the treatment effect is somewhat weakened, 
which is consistent with the smaller control sample size.  
To further illustrate that the results are not due to inherent differences in audit firm 
characteristics I additionally examine whether the treatment effect for Deloitte and EY, 
which adopted equalized leave in 2016, differs from trends for KPMG who did not adopt 
a similar policy over the same period. To do so, I remove firm-years audited by PWC from 
my sample (as they adopted equalized leave in 2014), and re-estimate Model (2) with 
RESTATEMENT as the depending variable, replacing LEAVE in Model (2) with firm-year 
indicators. Similar to my tests of the parallel trends, I omit year t-1 as the benchmark group 
because the inclusion of all event-year indicators in the regression results in perfect 
collinearity. Therefore, this design allows me to map out the time series trends of audit 
quality for each firm. Figures 5 and 6 plot the regression coefficients on these firm-year 
indicators. Prior to the adoption of equalized parental leave policies, the coefficients are 
not significantly different from zero for either group. The improvements in audit quality 
become apparent beginning in year t, for Deloitte and EY, while no such trend is noted for 
KPMG audits. This evidence further supports my original findings as well as the 
conclusion that the results do not appear to be driven by audit firm size or other inherent 
audit firm characteristics. 
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5.3. What Leads to the Improvements in Audit Quality? 
 A supportive firm culture should improve organizational performance, at least in 
part, through increased employee job satisfaction (Shore et al. 2011). In other words, job 
satisfaction may be a key mechanism whereby equalized leave leads to the improved audit 
quality shown in my tests of H2. To validate this, I use anonymous reviews submitted on 
Glassdoor.com by current and former audit employees to evaluate the impact of equalized 
leave policies on employee perceptions of their audit firms. I hand collect all job ratings 
submitted by full-time US employees of each of the firms included in my sample for the 
period 2010-2018.27 From these approximately 17,000 ratings, I require that an employee’s 
title indicates employment in an audit or assurance role, and that reviews identify a location 
to allow for the inclusion of MSA fixed effects. This results in a sample of 2,335 total 
reviews to estimate the following generalized difference-in-differences model:   
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑀𝑆𝐴 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
Where Rating takes one of three values that measure employee reviews of audit 
firms. The first OVERALL_REVIEW is the overall rating score an employee gave his or 
her employer. The second, BALANCE_REVIEW is the employee’s work-life balance 
review score, while the third proxy, COMP_REVIEW is an employee’s rating of his or 
                                                 
27 Glassdoor.com is a website that allows current and former employees to anonymously, and voluntarily, 
review companies. Individuals rate companies overall and on ‘sub-topics’ on a score from 1-5, where 
higher reviews indicate greater satisfaction. 
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her employer’s compensation and benefits.28 The independent variable of interest, 
LEAVE, is an indicator variable equal to one if the employee’s review was submitted for 
a firm that adopted equalized leave policies as of the date of the review, and zero 
otherwise. I include controls for an employee’s job tenure (REVIEW_EXP), and indicator 
variables equal to one if an employee indicated that he or she was a current (CURRENT) 
or former (FORMER) employee at the time of review. Finally, I include MSA, year, and 
audit firm fixed effects to control for any factors related to employee location, or other 
firm or temporal factors that could influence employee reviews. 
I predict employee ratings will increase following the adoption of equalized leave 
benefits, and present results in Table 12. In regression (1), I find a positive and significant 
(p-value, one-tailed < 0.05) coefficient on LEAVE, indicating that overall employee 
reviews are on average 0.16 points greater if the employee’s firm had adopted equalized 
leave. Similarly, in regression (2) I find that the coefficient on LEAVE is positive and 
significant (p-value, one-tailed < 0.01), which indicates that employees’ ratings of work-
life balance are approximately 0.21 points greater if the employee’s firm had adopted 
equalized leave. Finally, in regression (3) I find that the coefficient on LEAVE is positive 
and marginally significant (p-value, one-tailed < 0.10). In untabulated analyses, I note 
that no such relationship exists for other sub-ratings, and similarly find that employees’ 
reviews are more likely to include comments related to ‘maternity’ and ‘paternity’ 
                                                 
28 In untabulated analyses, I find that employment as an auditor strongly predicts lower employee ratings of 
work/life balance as well as compensation & benefits among public accounting employees. No such 
relationship is present with other sub-ratings. Accordingly, I focus on these two sub-ratings as they are 
likely to be most impactful for auditors, and similarly may be most likely to be impacted by expanded leave 
policy adoption.  
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benefits subsequent to the adoption of equalized leave, further supporting the underlying 
mechanism. Collectively, these results indicate that employee job satisfaction is a likely 
mechanism through which equalized leave improves audit quality.  
5.4. Do Expanded Employee Benefits Lead to Greater Costs? 
A key factor that may deter firms from implementing equalized leave policies is 
concern over related costs of providing such benefits. Specifically, the monetary expense 
of providing expanded leave policies may lead to increased overall audit costs in light of 
added paid time off for many audit employees which could necessitate a larger employee 
workforce or decreased job performance among the remaining workforce. Conversely, 
economic theory suggests that improved retention from increased parental leave benefits 
could result in efficiencies due to lower costs of hiring and training, as well as overall 
performance efficiencies associated with retained employees (e.g. Beauregard and Henry 
2009). Such cost additions or savings are likely to be passed through to audit clients 
(Simunic 1980). Thus, I explore whether audit fees are impacted for treatment firm years 
in my sample using the following regression: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
In this model, I regress the natural logarithm of audit fees (LogAF) for all firm 
years in my sample, where the independent variable of interest, LEAVE, is as previously 
defined in Model (2). I additionally incorporate key control variables used in prior studies 
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(e.g. Hay, Knechel and Wong 2006; Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor 2012; Lobo and 
Zhao 2013) related to auditor effort and risk. With regard to auditor effort, I control for 
company size (LNASSETS), foreign business operations (FOREIGN), and M&A activity 
(MERGER), and also include OPINION, an indicator equal to one if the company 
receives a going concern opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. For client risk, I control 
for key financial ratios of company i in year t, including the current ratio (CR), the ratio 
of current assets to total assets (CA_TA), accounts receivable and inventory, scaled by 
total assets (ARINV), return on assets (ROA), the ratio of intangible assets to total assets 
(INTANG), and company leverage (LEV), and additionally include LOSS, an indicator 
equal to one if company i incurred a loss in year t, and zero otherwise. I also include 
BUSY if to control for companies with a calendar year end, and MATWEAK, to control 
for the internal control quality of company i. Finally, I include industry and year fixed 
effects as well as audit firm indicators as in Model (2).  
As shown in Table 13, I find a negative, but insignificant (two-tailed), coefficient 
on LEAVE. Thus, my results show no statistically significant evidence that audit fees are 
impacted by the adoption of equalized leave. This may indicate that any direct costs of 
providing such leave are offset by cost efficiencies of greater employee retention. This 
analysis is subject to noise, as audit fees are shown to be “sticky” (De Villiers, Hay, and 
Zhang 2014) and large firms may choose to bear some of the costs of firm investments 
without adjusting audit fees. Nevertheless, these results appear to provide some early 
evidence to indicate that the introduction of equalized leave does not result in significant 
monetary costs for large audit firms. These findings are in line with economic predictions 
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that improvements to talent management can lead to reduced employee turnover intention, 
increased organizational performance, and overall cost efficiencies that are likely to offset 
the cost of such firm investments. 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
Prior research provides mixed evidence on how important human capital is in 
achieving audit quality. In this study, I investigate whether talent investments that 
promote a supportive organizational culture can improve audit quality in large accounting 
firms. Using hand-collected demographic data of audit employees, I first validate the 
association between non-partner employee attributes and audit quality. Next, using the 
staggered adoption of equalized parental and family leave policies by several large audit 
firms I find that investments in talent, particularly those that create a culture that enables 
employees to use such benefits, can lead to higher audit quality. Additional analyses 
reveal that such effects may be attributed to improved employee perceptions of job 
satisfaction. In addition, I find that the effects of cultural changes on audit quality are 
moderated by the local labor force characteristics of individual audit offices, including 
gender and family demographics and local audit labor economics, which further validates 
my main findings. Overall, these results show that despite firm-level oversight and 
controls intended to produce uniform audit quality, strong organizational culture remains 
a precondition to audit quality even in large audit firms. Further, these results support 
economic theory around equalized parental leave and show empirical evidence of the 
impacts of such policies on organizational performance. 
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My study is subject to several limitations. While my results are robust to 
numerous alternative specifications and additional analyses that support my findings and 
conclusions, audit firms voluntarily adopt employee benefits. Accordingly, I cannot rule 
out the possibility that other firm factors could contribute to my results. Additionally, the 
adoption of expanded parental leave benefits is likely to impact audit quality through 
both reduced turnover and increased employee performance related to job satisfaction. 
These mechanisms may be jointly impacted by improved employee job satisfaction; 
however, my study is unable to separate these two mechanisms in evaluating audit quality 
improvements. Further, my study is unable to evaluate how increased flexibility from 
equalized leave arrangements may impact the effectiveness of employee training and 
evaluation mechanisms. Finally, while I am able to provide some descriptive evidence 
indicating a lasting impact of improved culture, I am unable to directly observe the long-
term impacts of such investments. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results from this study have important 
implications for practitioners’ talent management efforts and regulators’ ongoing projects 
around quality control and human capital in auditing and accounting. Taken together, my 
findings indicate that despite highly regulated firm controls, audit quality is dependent 
upon developing an organizational culture that can increase firms’ ability to attract, 
motivate, and retain the right people, and that audit firms are likely to benefit from 
continued investments in employee talent. Further, given that prior research documents 
negative perceptions of work-life balance by employees of large audit firms, my study 
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specifically shows that large firms may benefit by investing in organizational culture that 
encourages inclusion, equality, and flexibility.  
My study focuses on a supportive firm culture that leads to greater perceived 
inclusion related to gender and family status, and while firms have seen progress in these 
areas, unique challenges remain in connection with broader inclusion initiatives related to 
demographics including, but not limited to, race and ethnicity. While I am unable to speak 
directly to such challenges, my study can provide evidence to accounting and audit firms 
that efforts to promote a culture of inclusion and diversity can strengthen organizational 
performance. My results additionally highlight the importance of tailoring talent 
investments to meet the needs of individual audit offices. Finally, my findings also build 
on economics and audit literature by providing new evidence on policy and demographic 
factors that moderate the effectiveness of paid family leave, and new evidence on the role 
that non-partner employees may uniquely play in delivering high audit quality. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Office Demographic Sample Selection       
        Sample Size 
US Client Firm-Year Observations for Big N and Mid-Market Audit Firm 
clients from 2017-2018 
                 9,851  
Less: company years with insufficient data to calculate variables in 
Regression Models 
 
               
(5,611) 
Less: Observations for which hand-collected employee 
demographic data not available 
 
               
(2,536) 
Sample to estimate Model (1): 
 
                 1,704  
          
          
Panel B: Difference in Differences Sample Selection 
        Sample Size 
US Client Firm-Year Observations for Big N and Mid-Tier Audit Firm 
clients from 2010-2018 
               47,307  
Less: company years with insufficient data to calculate variables in 
Regression Models 
 
              
(26,508) 
Less: Observations for companies with multiple auditors in any 
year of sample period or insufficient observations 
 
               
(5,173) 
Sample to measure the impact of equalized leave policies on audit quality: 
 
               15,626  
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Table 1: Sample Selection, continued 
 
Panel C: Industry Composition of Difference in Differences Sample     
           
Fama-French 12 Industries Combined  Treatment  Control  
  Freq. Pct  Freq. Pct  Freq. Pct  
Consumer Non-durables        737  4.72  174 4.80  563 4.69  
Consumer Durables        599  3.83  144 3.97  455 3.79  
Manufacturing      2,151  13.77  550 15.17  1,601 13.34  
Oil, Gas, and Coal        913  5.84  204 5.63  709 5.91  
Chemicals and Allied Products       514  3.29  142 3.92  372 3.10  
Computers, Software, and 
Electronics Equipment      2,894  18.52  623 17.18  2,271 18.93  
Telephone and Television 
Transmission       497  3.18  112 3.09  385 3.21  
Utilities        884  5.66  284 7.83  600 5.00  
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services     1,992  12.75  361 9.96  1,631 13.59  
Healthcare, Medical Equip. & Drugs     1,848  11.83  479 13.21  1,369 11.41  
Other      2,597  16.62  553 15.26  2,044 17.04  
Total    15,626      3,626    
  
12,000    
                      
Note: Financial firms are excluded for the sample and, as such, there are only eleven of the Fama-French 
twelve industries represented 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Office Employee Demographics Summary Statistics     
             
Variables  N  Mean  Std. Dev  P25  Median  P75 
             
ABS_DA      1,704   0.676  1.495  0.030  0.108  0.447 
RESTATEMENT      1,704   0.041  0.198  0.000  0.000  0.000 
PCT_MASTERS      1,704   61.258  17.412  48.464  57.895  76.563 
PCT_TOP50      1,704   50.942  20.784  31.950  52.941  65.894 
LNOFFICE      1,704   17.568  1.285  16.758  17.909  18.646 
LOSS_IB      1,704   0.285  0.452  0.000  0.000  1.000 
INDEXPERT      1,704   0.601  0.490  0.000  1.000  1.000 
TENURE      1,704   13.606  11.050  5.000  12.000  19.000 
LNASSETS      1,704   7.545  1.889  6.327  7.591  8.899 
OCF      1,704   0.053  0.160  0.041  0.079  0.117 
LEV      1,704   1.558  5.316  0.581  1.266  2.320 
REV_GROWTH      1,704   0.121  0.367  0.002  0.068  0.163 
OPINION      1,704   0.035  0.183  0.000  0.000  0.000 
STD_REV      1,704   0.102  0.114  0.032  0.067  0.128 
STD_OCF      1,704   0.044  0.068  0.013  0.024  0.047 
TOBINQ      1,704   2.019  1.731  1.075  1.501  2.331 
BIGN      1,704   0.850  0.357  1.000  1.000  1.000 
ABSACCRUALS      1,704   0.078  0.084  0.030  0.055  0.096 
PY_RESTATED      1,704   0.069  0.253  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, continued 
 
Panel B: Difference in Differences Sample Summary Statistics     
             
Variables  N  Mean  Std. Dev  P25  Median  P75              
ABS_DA    15,626   0.537  1.146  0.038  0.115  0.421 
RESTATEMENT    15,626   0.103  0.304  0.000  0.000  0.000 
LNOFFICE    15,626   17.586  1.414  16.601  17.822  18.669 
LOSS_IB    15,626   0.255  0.436  0.000  0.000  1.000 
INDEXPERT    15,626   0.571  0.495  0.000  1.000  1.000 
TENURE    15,626   13.038  9.770  6.000  11.000  17.000 
LNASSETS    15,626   7.257  1.868  5.970  7.295  8.542 
OCF    15,626   0.070  0.142  0.047  0.086  0.131 
LEV    15,626   1.519  5.111  0.491  1.062  2.043 
REV_GROWTH    15,626   0.092  0.333  -0.021  0.052  0.144 
OPINION    15,626   0.016  0.125  0.000  0.000  0.000 
STD_REV    15,626   0.109  0.122  0.034  0.069  0.135 
STD_OCF    15,626   0.045  0.059  0.014  0.028  0.052 
TOBINQ    15,626   2.234  1.873  1.179  1.643  2.529 
LOC_QUOTIENT    15,626   1.207  0.215  1.070  1.220  1.340 
LANDGRANT    15,626   0.219  0.413  0.000  0.000  0.000 
POP_PCT_CHANGE    15,626   0.031  0.032  0.002  0.029  0.060 
ABSACCRUALS    15,626   0.078  0.081  0.031  0.056  0.096 
PY_RESTATED    15,626   0.111  0.314  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, continued 
 
Panel C: Treatment and Control Firm Year Characteristics     
            
  Treatment  Control   
            
Variable  n Mean Med.  n Mean Med.  
Mean 
Diff.   
            
ABS_DA    3,626  0.563 0.118    12,000  0.529 0.115  0.034  
RESTATEMENT    3,626  0.070 0.000    12,000  0.113 0.000  -0.043 *** 
LNOFFICE    3,626  18.130 18.211    12,000  17.422 17.657  0.708 *** 
LOSS_IB    3,626  0.240 0.000    12,000  0.259 0.000  -0.018 * 
INDEXPERT    3,626  0.672 1.000    12,000  0.541 1.000  0.131 *** 
TENURE    3,626  16.328 15.000    12,000  12.044 10.000  4.284 *** 
LNASSETS    3,626  7.937 7.930    12,000  7.051 7.059  0.886 *** 
OCF    3,626  0.075 0.086    12,000  0.068 0.086  0.006 * 
LEV    3,626  1.751 1.298    12,000  1.448 0.995  0.302 ** 
REV_GROWTH    3,626  0.075 0.044    12,000  0.098 0.054  -0.023 *** 
OPINION    3,626  0.015 0.000    12,000  0.016 0.000  -0.001  
STD_REV    3,626  0.090 0.056    12,000  0.115 0.073  -0.024 *** 
STD_OCF    3,626  0.038 0.023    12,000  0.047 0.029  -0.008 *** 
TOBINQ    3,626  2.305 1.701    12,000  2.212 1.625  0.093 ** 
LOC_QUOTIENT    3,626  1.207 1.210    12,000  1.206 1.220  0.001  
LANDGRANT    3,626  0.214 0.000    12,000  0.220 0.000  -0.007  
POP_PCT_CHANGE    3,626  0.030 0.024    12,000  0.032 0.029  -0.002 ** 
LAGABSACCRUALS    3,626  0.074 0.054    12,000  0.079 0.057  -0.005 ** 
PY_RESTATED    3,626  0.100 0.000    12,000  0.114 0.000  -0.014 * 
                        
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used throughout the paper. Panel A presents descriptive 
statistics for the full sample, while Panel B presents descriptive statistics separately for Treatment (LEAVE = 1) and 
Control (LEAVE=0) observations.  *, **, *** Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix A.         
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Table 3: Correlation Tables 
   Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables in Employee Demographics Sample 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) ABS_DA 1 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 -0.19 -0.02 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.21 0.06 0.15 -0.02
(2) RESTATEMENT 1 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.50
(3) PCT_MASTERS 1 0.49 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.04
(4) PCT_TOP_50 1 0.16 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03
(5) LNOFFICE 1 -0.10 0.11 0.22 0.42 0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 0.03
(6) LOSS_IB 1 -0.14 -0.21 -0.33 -0.46 -0.02 -0.02 0.24 0.13 0.31 0.47 -0.05 0.03
(7) INDEXPERT 1 0.15 0.28 0.09 0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 0.00
(8) TENURE 1 0.33 0.14 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -0.03 -0.01
(9) LNASSETS 1 0.35 0.12 -0.02 -0.23 -0.26 -0.44 -0.26 -0.15 0.00
(10) OCF 1 0.04 -0.06 -0.41 -0.09 -0.61 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01
(11) LEV 1 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.02
(12) REV_GROWTH 1 -0.03 0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.27 -0.01
(13) OPINION 1 0.06 0.36 0.32 0.01 0.00
(14) STD_REV 1 0.26 0.14 0.12 -0.01
(15) STD_OCF 1 0.30 0.26 -0.01
(16) TOBINQ 1 -0.01 -0.05
(17) LAGABSACCRUALS 1 0.00
(18) PY_RESTATED 1
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Table 3: Correlation Tables, continued 
  
  Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables in Difference in Differences Sample 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
(1) ABS_DA 1 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.15 -0.02 0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.17 0.14 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.05
(2) RESTATEMENT 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.02
(3) LNOFFICE 1 -0.03 0.01 0.17 0.32 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.14 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.32 -0.04 -0.22
(4) LOSS_IB 1 -0.08 -0.17 -0.33 -0.49 -0.01 -0.03 0.20 -0.11 0.32 0.00 0.46 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01
(5) INDEXPERT 1 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.14 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 -0.18 0.00 0.06
(6) TENURE 1 0.33 0.11 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.19 -0.13 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06
(7) LNASSETS 1 0.34 0.12 -0.05 -0.17 0.52 -0.43 -0.16 -0.26 0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.02
(8) OCF 1 0.02 -0.05 -0.35 0.09 -0.52 0.00 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.06
(9) LEV 1 0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(10) REV_GROWTH 1 -0.02 0.01 0.18 0.28 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00
(11) OPINION 1 -0.04 0.28 0.01 0.24 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
(12) STD_REV 1 -0.10 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.03
(13) STD_OCF 1 0.26 0.29 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.00
(14) TOBINQ 1 0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.04
(15) LAGABSACCRUALS 1 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.08
(16) PY_RESTATED 1 0.02 0.00 0.02
(17) LOC_QUOTIENT 1 0.16 0.06
(18) LANDGRANT 1 0.11
(19) POP_PCT_CHANGE 1
Note : This table presents the pairwise Pearson correlations, Bold face type indicates statistical significance at p < 0.01. Variable definitions are 
included in Appendix A
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Table 4: Main Effect of Employee Qualification on Audit Quality 
 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
PCT_MASTERS -0.004 -0.816 -0.051 -1.968 **
PCT_TOP_50 -0.010 -3.171 *** -0.028 -1.258
LNOFFICE -0.043 -0.978 -0.049 -0.190 -0.026 -0.596 0.022 0.085
LOSS_IB -0.159 -1.748 * 0.332 0.835 -0.152 -1.691 * 0.348 0.850
INDEXPERT -0.065 -0.931 0.673 1.790 * -0.057 -0.850 0.741 1.920 *
TENURE 0.002 0.728 -0.013 -0.768 0.002 0.627 -0.013 -0.771
LNASSETS 0.009 0.381 0.201 1.555 0.010 0.408 0.222 1.706 *
OCF 0.139 0.262 -3.268 -1.536 0.141 0.267 -3.363 -1.596
LEV -0.003 -0.468 -0.021 -0.855 -0.003 -0.502 -0.026 -1.172
REV_GROWTH 0.118 0.640 -0.101 -0.296 0.121 0.658 -0.084 -0.248
OPINION 0.387 1.357 -1.692 -1.296 0.373 1.321 -1.688 -1.398
STD_REV 0.552 1.815 * -0.959 -0.531 0.585 1.928 * -0.934 -0.513
STD_OCF 1.734 1.536 -2.099 -0.458 1.709 1.525 -2.408 -0.527
TOBINQ -0.019 -0.682 0.005 0.040 -0.017 -0.645 0.006 0.049
BIGN 0.091 0.590 -0.645 -0.785 0.148 0.975 -0.987 -1.274
LAGABSACCRUALS 0.285 0.552 0.288 0.555
PY_RESTATED 4.022 10.017 *** 4.031 9.943 ***





*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (1) for all observations in my sub-sample of audit 
offices for which direct demographic data were collected. Test statistics are calculated using standard errors 
clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. Fixed effects as indicated are included, but the 
coefficients are suppressed for brevity.
DV = Abn. Accr.
Adj./Psuedo R-squared
Yes Yes



















Table 5: The Impact of Expanded Leave Policies on Audit Quality: Abnormal 
Accruals 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
LEAVE -0.049 -1.908 * -0.046 -1.776 * -0.047 -1.828 * -0.045 -1.762 *
LNOFFICE -0.033 -3.190 *** -0.036 -2.955 *** -0.016 -0.911
LOSS_IB -0.060 -2.315 ** -0.060 -2.338 ** -0.007 -0.255
INDEXPERT -0.040 -1.803 * -0.037 -1.659 * -0.040 -1.372
TENURE -0.002 -1.646 -0.002 -1.530 0.002 0.976
LNASSETS 0.003 0.377 0.002 0.210 0.000 0.009
OCF 0.385 2.824 *** 0.376 2.764 *** -0.043 -0.262
LEV 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.497
REV_GROWTH 0.109 2.276 ** 0.109 2.288 ** 0.140 2.842 ***
OPINION 0.587 4.712 *** 0.583 4.739 *** 0.389 3.478 ***
STD_REV 0.533 6.035 *** 0.530 6.054 *** 0.196 1.857 *
STD_OCF -0.312 -1.032 -0.317 -1.053 0.736 2.047 **
TOBINQ -0.005 -0.645 -0.005 -0.592 0.032 2.732 ***
LAGABSACCRUALS 0.275 2.234 ** 0.264 2.149 ** 0.090 0.765
LOC_QUOTIENT 0.078 1.329 0.083 1.114
LANDGRANT -0.063 -2.239 ** -0.062 -0.928
POP_PCT_CHANGE 0.410 1.212 -1.517 -1.873 *






*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (2) for all observations in my sample. Column (1) 
presents the results when including only fixed effects in the model, while column (2) presents results when 
including firm and auditor controls, and column (3) adds MSA-level controls. Column (4) presents the results 
when replacing industry fixed effects with company fixed effects. Test statistics are calculated using standard 
errors clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. Fixed effects as indicated are included, but the 
coefficients are suppressed for brevity.
Adjusted R-squared
No No No Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes No
15,626 15,626 15,626 15,626
0.304 0.313 0.314 0.393
Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 57 
Table 6: The Impact of Expanded Leave Policies on Audit Quality: Restatements 
 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
LEAVE -0.441 -3.472 *** -0.468 -3.852 *** -0.468 -3.839 *** -0.536 -3.911 ***
LNOFFICE -0.031 -1.102 -0.027 -0.831 -0.101 -1.076
LOSS_IB 0.044 0.492 0.043 0.482 0.038 0.349
INDEXPERT -0.075 -1.026 -0.073 -0.998 0.088 0.693
TENURE -0.003 -0.755 -0.003 -0.665 0.007 0.571
LNASSETS 0.011 0.453 0.011 0.429 0.516 4.655 ***
OCF -0.266 -0.779 -0.279 -0.821 -0.648 -1.178
LEV 0.007 1.274 0.008 1.302 0.000 0.044
REV_GROWTH 0.183 1.759 * 0.183 1.767 * 0.083 0.684
OPINION -0.061 -0.188 -0.060 -0.186 -0.296 -0.835
STD_REV 0.177 0.609 0.169 0.580 1.023 2.549 **
STD_OCF -1.394 -1.920 * -1.423 -1.960 * 0.515 0.464
TOBINQ -0.029 -1.296 -0.029 -1.306 0.013 0.374
PY_RESTATED 3.147 44.895 *** 3.145 44.696 *** 1.213 16.953 ***
LOC_QUOTIENT 0.118 0.679 0.213 0.574
LANDGRANT -0.025 -0.298 0.089 0.311
POP_PCT_CHANGE 1.531 1.420 -0.665 -0.146






*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (2) for all observations in my sample. Column (1) 
presents the results when including only fixed effects in the model, while column (2) presents results when 
including firm and auditor controls, and column (3) adds MSA-level controls. Column (4) presents the results 
when replacing industry fixed effects with company fixed effects. Test statistics are calculated using standard 
errors clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. Fixed effects as indicated are included, but the 
coefficients are suppr ssed for brevity.
Pseudo R-squared
Yes Yes Yes No
No No No Yes
0.0703 0.305 0.305 0.164
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat.
15,611 15,611 15,611 5,458
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 7: Equalized Leave Policy Effect on Audit Quality: City Level Demographics 
 
Coeff. Coeff.







Chow test of equality with LOW
Coeff. Coeff.







Chow test of equality with LOW
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
χ2  = 6.26**
Note: This table presents the results of estimating Model (2) for the the samples of offices in the top 
and bottom tercile of DUAL_INC  (Panel A) and LOC_QUOTIENT (Panel B).  I then test for 
differences in audit quality between each tercile. Test statistics are calculated using standard errors 
clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. Fixed effects as indicated and controls are 





Low Location Quotient High Location Quotient
DV=Restatement DV=Restatement
Test Stat. Test Stat.
Yes Yes
Yes Yes





Low Dual Income High Dual Income
DV=Restatement DV=Restatement
Test Stat. Test Stat.
Panel A: Equalized Leave Policy by Tercile of Local Dual Income Rates
Panel B: Equalized Leave Policy by Tercile of Location Quotient
*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 8: Equalized Leave Policy Effect on Audit Quality: Office Level 
Demographics 
Coeff. Coeff.







Chow test of equality with LOW
Coeff. Coeff.







Chow test of equality with LOW
*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 




Low Masters Attainment High Masters Attainment
DV=Restatement DV=Restatement
Panel B: Equalized Leave Policy by Tercile of Office Masters Attainment
Note: This table presents the results of estimating Model (2) for the the sub-sample of offices in the top 
and bottom tercile of PROP_FEMALE  (Panel A) and PROP_MASTERS  (Panel B). I then test for 
differences in audit quality between each tercile. Test statistics are calculated using standard errors 
clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. Fixed effects as indicated and controls are included, 






χ2  = .82
Low Female Employment High Female Employment
Test Stat. Test Stat.
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Panel A: Equalized Leave Policy by Tercile of Office Female Employee Percentage
Test Stat. Test Stat.
5,964 4,593
0.328 0.313




Table 9: The Impact of Expanded Leave Policies on Audit Quality: Matched Sample 
 
Coeff. Coeff.
LEAVE -0.107 -2.046 ** -0.413 -1.724 *
BIRTH_RATE 0.019 4.208 *** 0.045 2.707 ***
LNOFFICE -0.057 -2.607 *** 0.009 0.122
LOSS_IB -0.048 -1.155 -0.067 -0.371
INDEXPERT -0.057 -1.493 -0.058 -0.370
TENURE -0.001 -0.767 -0.007 -1.108
LNASSETS 0.021 1.330 -0.002 -0.044
OCF 0.145 0.638 -1.593 -2.269 **
LEV -0.000 -0.118 0.021 1.739 *
REV_GROWTH 0.177 1.892 * 0.438 2.317 **
OPINION 0.666 3.708 *** -0.204 -0.455
STD_REV -0.000 -1.048 -0.000 -1.319
STD_OCF 1.043 1.700 * -4.596 -2.647 ***
TOBINQ -0.004 -0.317 0.015 0.410
LOC_QUOTIENT 0.238 2.077 ** -0.138 -0.411
LANDGRANT -0.043 -1.011 -0.143 -0.874
POP_PCT_CHANGE -0.821 -1.479 -2.403 -1.021
LAGABSACCRUALS 0.317 1.654 *
PY_RESTATED 2.941 21.005 ***






*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (2) using coarsened exact matching. Column 
(1) presents the results when including only fixed effects in the model, while column (2) presents results 
when including firm and auditor controls, and column (3) adds MSA-level controls. Test statistics are 
calculated using standard errors clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. Fixed effects as 




DV = Abnormal Accruals DV = Restatement
Test Stat. Test Stat.
4,821 4,679
Model 1: OLS Model 2: Logistic
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LEAVE -0.034 -0.829 0.192 0.751
LNOFFICE -0.015 -1.530 0.002 0.063
LOSS_IB -0.068 -2.606 *** 0.170 1.649 *
INDEXPERT -0.036 -1.590 -0.066 -0.758
TENURE -0.003 -2.496 ** 0.002 0.345
LNASSETS -0.012 -1.403 0.109 3.347 ***
OCF 0.416 3.138 *** 0.145 0.381
LEV 0.002 0.834 0.002 0.255
REV_GROWTH 0.150 2.263 ** 0.017 0.137
OPINION 0.343 3.076 *** -0.556 -1.278
STD_REV 0.000 2.483 ** -0.000 -2.577 ***
STD_OCF 0.127 0.429 0.517 0.642
TOBINQ 0.011 1.213 -0.012 -0.458
LOC_QUOTIENT -0.032 -0.749 0.001 0.006
LANDGRANT -0.063 -2.527 ** 0.035 0.359
POP_PCT_CHANGE 0.248 0.783 2.424 1.842 *
LAGABSACCRUALS 0.226 1.880 *
PY_RESTATED 3.184 35.875 ***






*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (2) using using a psuedo-event period from 
2005-2013 with event dates staggered consistent with the event dates in the full sample in Tables 4 & 5. 
Test statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. 




DV = Abnormal Accruals DV = Restatement
Test Stat. Test Stat.
8,352 8,293
Model 1: OLS Model 2: Logistic
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Table 11: The Impact of Expanded Leave Policies on Audit Quality: Big 4 Sample 
 
Coeff. Coeff.
LEAVE -0.045 -1.708 * -0.314 -2.303 **
LNOFFICE -0.030 -2.363 ** -0.043 -1.274
LOSS_IB -0.049 -1.657 * 0.083 0.841
INDEXPERT -0.044 -1.811 * -0.115 -1.485
TENURE -0.002 -1.552 -0.003 -0.731
LNASSETS 0.000 0.058 0.006 0.215
OCF 0.495 3.249 *** -0.356 -0.945
LEV 0.000 0.139 0.009 1.514
REV_GROWTH 0.102 1.888 * 0.105 0.868
OPINION 0.559 3.978 *** -0.122 -0.282
STD_REV 0.601 6.192 *** 0.238 0.712
STD_OCF -0.489 -1.446 -1.583 -1.853 *
TOBINQ -0.006 -0.662 -0.030 -1.183
LOC_QUOTIENT 0.025 0.438 0.161 0.866
LANDGRANT -0.059 -1.933 * -0.056 -0.595
POP_PCT_CHANGE 0.609 1.649 * 1.700 1.460
LAGABSACCRUALS 0.235 1.647 *
PY_RESTATED 3.110 41.176 ***






*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (2) using using a population that contains only 
firm-years audited by Big 4 audit firms. Test statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered for 





DV = Abnormal Accruals DV = Restatement
Test Stat. Test Stat.
13,391 13,384
Model 1: OLS Model 2: Logistic
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Table 12: Effect of Equalized Leave on Employee Job Satisfaction 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
LEAVE 0.159 1.781 ** 0.213 2.656 *** 0.119 1.613 *
REVIEW_EXP 0.037 3.750 *** 0.018 1.995 ** 0.011 0.771
CURRENT 0.090 1.344 0.025 0.272 0.012 0.186
FORMER -0.301 -5.080 *** -0.362 -3.591 *** -0.089 -0.958






*, **, and *** Represent one-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions are included in Appendix A
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (3) for all observations in my sample of hand-collected employee review data 
from 2010-2018. Column (1) presents the results for overall review ratings, while columns (2) and (3) present the results for employee 
reviews of work-life balance and compensation, repectively.  Test statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered for each 





DV = Overall_Review DV = Balance_Review DV = Comp_Review
Test Stat. Test Stat. Test Stat.
(1) (2) (3)
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LNASSETS 0.513 74.223 ***
CR -0.037 -6.004 ***
CA_TA 0.746 9.654 ***
ARINV 0.483 5.284 ***
ROA -0.178 -5.137 ***
LOSS_IB 0.154 9.840 ***
FOREIGN -0.064 -0.420
MERGER 0.031 1.585
BUSY 0.039 1.792 *
LEV 0.000 0.415
INTANG 0.424 7.162 ***
OPINION 0.094 2.019 **
MATWEAK 0.185 6.859 ***








DV=  Log Audit Fees
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Model (4) for all 
observations in my sample. Test statistics are calculated using standard 
errors clustered for each unique client firm in the sample. Fixed effects as 
indicated are included, but the coefficients are suppressed for brevity.
*, **, and *** Represent two-tailed statistical significance at p < 0.10, 







Figure 1: Abnormal Accruals Parallel Trends Assumption 
 
Figure 2: Restatements Parallel Trends Assumption 
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Figure 3: Abnormal Accruals Parallel Trends Assumption: Big 4 Sample 
 
 
Figure 4: Restatements Parallel Trends Assumption: Big 4 Sample 
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Figure 5: Restatements Time Series Trend: EY & Deloitte 
 
Figure 6: Restatements Time Series Trend: KPMG 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition  Source 
ABS_DA 
 
= The absolute value of abnormal accruals 
estimated from the Francis and Yu (2009) 
accruals model discussed in Chapter 3 of this 
paper. The equation is estimated by industry 





= the ratio of the company's accounts 
receivable (RECT) plus inventory (INV) to 





= The average years of post-graduation work 
experience of for audit office employees as 
described in Chapter 4  
HC 
BALANCE_REVIEW = The firm work-life balance review score 
given by an individual employee on a scale 





= An indicator variable equal to one if the the 
company auditor is a Big 4 audit firm (EY, 




= an indicator variable set equal to 1 if a 
company’s fiscal year end is December 31st, 





= the ratio of the company's current assets 





= The firm compensation and benefits review 
score given by an individual employee on a 
scale from 1-5, where higher scores indicate 




= the company's current ratio, measured as 
current assets (ACT) divided by current 




(continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
     
Variable  Definition  Source 
CURRENT 
 
= An indicator variable equal to one if an 
employee indicated he or she was a current 





= an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the 






= An indicator variable equal to one if an 
employee indicated that he or she was a former 





= An indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor 
is the city-industry leader, measured using total 
audit fees within a particular 2-digit SIC code 
within a single city, calculated using all firm-





= the ratio of the company's intangible assets 




= The absolute value of total client-firm 
accruals (Compustat item NI - Compustat item 





= An indicator variable equal to one for 
observation in which the audit firm had 





= An indicator variable equal to one if the 







= The ratio of total liabilities (Compustat item 





=The natural log of the audit client's total 









(continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
     
Variable  Definition  Source 
LNOFFICE 
 
= The natural log of total audit fees in the 
current year by the opinion signing auditor's 
office. Audit offices are defined as all audits 
for which the opinion is signed by a common 
audit firm (Audit Analytics item 
AUDITOR_FKEY_ and city name (Audit 





= The labor quotient for accountants and 
auditors (Occupation 13-2011) for the MSA in 
which the signing auditor office is located. 
Calculated as the number of accountants and 
auditors per capita at the MSA level divided by 
the same ratio at the national level. Calculated 
on a yearly basis  
BLS 
LogAF  = The natural log of total audit fees  AA 
LOSS_IB 
 
= An indicator variable equal to 1 if the client 
firm reported negative income before 






= an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the 
company received a material weakness internal 






= an indicator set equal to 1 if the company 
reported pre-tax merger and acquisition 





= total client company cash flows from 
operations (Compustat item OANCF) scaled 





= an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit 
client received a going concern opinion in the 
current year; and 0 otherwise (Audit Analytics 





(continued on next page) 
 71 
APPENDIX A (continued) 
     
Variable  Definition  Source 
OVERALL_REVIEW 
 
= The firm overall review score given by an 
individual employee on a scale from 1-5, 
where higher scores indicate greater 
satisfaction  
HC 
PCT_FEMALE  = The percentage of audit office employees 
who are female. Determined using historic US 
Social Security Administration data as 
described in Chapter 4  
HC 
PCT_MASTERS  = The percentage of audit office employees 
who indicated that they obtained a graduate 
degree through publicly available social 





 = The proportion of audit office employees 
who indicated that they attended a university 
that is ranked in the Top 50 accounting 
programs. University attendance information is 
obtained through publicly available social 
networking platforms as described in Chapter 
4, while rankings are obtained from the 2017-





= The percentage change in population from 
2014-2018 for the MSA in which the signing 





= An indicator variable equal to 1 if a client 
firm's financial statements from year t-1 were 
eventually restated, as reported in Audit 






= An indicator variable equal to 1 if a client 
firm-year's financial statements were 
eventually restated, as reported by the Audit 





(continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
     
Variable  Definition  Source 
REV_GROWTH 
 
= Total client firm revenue in the current year 
(Compustat item REVT) less revenue in period 






= The number of years that an employee 
indicated they had spent at the reviewed audit 
firm as of the time that the employee review 




= return on assets, defined as earnings before 
interest and taxes (OIADP) divided by total 




=The standard deviation of client firm cash 
flows from operations (Compustat item 





=The standard deviation of client firm revenue 






= Tobin's Q, calculated as the client firm's 
market value of equity, less the book value of 
equity, plus total assets, all scaled by lagged 











AA  = Audit Analytics  
 
C  = Compustat  
 
BLS  = Bureau of Labor Statistics  
 
HC  = Hand Collected   
USC  = US Census Data  
 




Appendix B: Hand Collected Demographic Office Composition 
 
MSA Code  MSA Name  Observations  Total Audit Fees 
       
12060  Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA                624    $   1,840,000,000  
12420  Austin-Round Rock, TX                128            231,000,000  
13820  Birmingham-Hoover, AL                  73            136,000,000  
15380  Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY                  84              99,000,000  
16740  Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC                352            983,000,000  
16980  Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI             1,142         3,990,000,000  
17140  Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN                195            718,000,000  
17460  Cleveland-Elyria, OH                346         1,130,000,000  
19740  Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO                453            904,000,000  
19820  Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI                318         1,610,000,000  
25540  Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT                160            731,000,000  
26420  Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX             1,110         3,200,000,000  
26900  Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN                244            520,000,000  
28140  Kansas City, MO-KS                191            415,000,000  
33340  Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI                399            987,000,000  
34980  Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN                187            355,000,000  
37980  Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD               777         2,170,000,000  
38060  Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ                280            644,000,000  
38300  Pittsburgh, PA                248            659,000,000  
41180  St. Louis, MO-IL                305         1,040,000,000  
41620  Salt Lake City, UT                169            169,000,000  
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MSA Code  MSA Name  Observations  Total Audit Fees 
42660  Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA                353         1,180,000,000  
45300  Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL                168            408,000,000  
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